Critical Theory and the Limits of Academic Economics: Resolving the Political in Piketty\u27s Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Krier, Daniel A. & Amidon, Kevin S
World Languages and Cultures Publications World Languages and Cultures
2014
Critical Theory and the Limits of Academic
Economics: Resolving the Political in Piketty's
Capital in the Twenty-First Century
Daniel A. Krier
Iowa State University, krier@iastate.edu
Kevin S. Amidon
Iowa State University, ksamidon@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/language_pubs
Part of the Economic History Commons, Educational Sociology Commons, German Literature
Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, Other German Language and Literature
Commons, and the Other Sociology Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
language_pubs/84. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the World Languages and Cultures at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in World Languages and Cultures Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Critical Theory and the Limits of Academic Economics: Resolving the
Political in Piketty's Capital in the Twenty-First Century
Abstract
This essay assesses the central arguments of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century. We note Piketty’s
limited engagement with and active distancing from the writings of Marx. Piketty’s location within the
disciplinary boundaries of academic economics seems to have profoundly shaped his surprisingly apolitical
analysis. Engagement with the political dimensions of capital is further constrained to increase the book’s
influence upon policy. We analyze important limitations to Piketty’s work that result from these disciplinary
constraints. Important politically implicated concepts, problems, and approaches that relate to Piketty’s
substantial empirical work are: labor process studies, research on speculative capitalism, and literature
highlighting institutional and political determinants among varieties of capitalism.
Keywords
capitalism, class, critical theory, inequality, Marxism, patrimony, political economy
Disciplines
Economic History | Educational Sociology | German Literature | Inequality and Stratification | Other
German Language and Literature | Other Sociology
Comments
his is a manuscript of an article from Critical Sociology (2014): 1, doi: 10.1177/089692051456548487.
Posted with permission. Not for quotation or distribution.
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/language_pubs/84
This is a manuscript of an article from Critical Sociology (2014): 1, doi: 10.1177/089692051456548487. Posted with permission. Not for quotation or distribution. 
Critical theory and the limits of academic economics: resolving the political in Piketty’s 
Capital in the twenty-first century 
Daniel Krier 
Iowa State University, USA 
Kevin S. Amidon 
Iowa State University, USA 
Abstract 
This essay assesses the central arguments of Piketty’s Capital in the twenty-first century. We 
note Piketty’s limited engagement with and active distancing from the writings of Marx. 
Piketty’s location within the disciplinary boundaries of academic economics seems to have 
profoundly shaped his surprisingly apolitical analysis. Engagement with the political dimensions 
of capital is further constrained to increase the book’s influence upon policy. We analyze 
important limitations to Piketty’s work that result from these disciplinary constraints. Important 
politically implicated concepts, problems, and approaches that relate to Piketty’s substantial 
empirical work: labor process studies, research on speculative capitalism, and literature 
highlighting institutional and political determinants among varieties of capitalism. 
Keywords 
Introduction 
It has been two decades since a social scientific work on inequality last attracted the level of 
media attention received by Thomas Piketty’s New York Times best-selling Capital in the twenty-
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first century . In 1994, Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray published their controversial The 
bell curve, a book that quickly sold 400,000 copies amid media coverage, policy discussion, and 
widespread engagement (and criticism) by academics. Popular attention to The bell curve faded 
quickly while academic discussion peaked soon after. We suspect that Piketty’s bubble of 
notoriety is fated to be similarly short-lived, despite occasionally displays of academic and 
journalistic interest (including being named the Financial Times’s Business.Book of the Year in 
November 2014). These two books, while profoundly different in tone, approach, 
methodological sophistication, and scholarly heft, seem committed to a similar goal: to make 
themselves available as resources to policymakers while appearing always to stand upon an 
academic-disciplinary pedestal that raises them above the hurly-burly of politics. Much of the 
publication success of both works in the American media market surely derives from this 
ostensibly apolitical stance. 
 Despite this affinity with one of the more notorious publications of the 1990’s the 
attention and praise received by Capital in the twenty-first century has been well deserved. The 
book builds on the work of dozens of sophisticated economists, and contains a wealth of 
empirical time-series data on comparative income distribution. This makes it an impressive 
resource for future scholarship and analysis. Nonetheless, the book remains impaired by its 
excessively narrow disciplinary focus within contemporary academic economics. Piketty’s work 
clearly strains to avoid any whiff of the political. It shies from an engagement with Marx and 
Marxist interpretive traditions that have long sought a differentiated analysis of the mechanisms 
and dynamics of capital. It therefore fails to connect with important current strands of critical 
theory. In this review we hope to point to potential moments of such connection. 
Piketty appears – doubtless for good reason within academic economics – to be so 
	
	
	 3
committed to first-order empiricism that his book seems uninterested in, even dismissive of, 
interpretive conclusions. This is understandable across the European and American spheres, 
where central banks, technocratic policy institutions, think tanks, and academic work hew 
compulsively to a rhetoric of apolitical economic science. Unfortunately, Capital in the Twenty-
First Century thus becomes as once too much and too little: it sets up expectations in left-
progressive readers familiar with Marx that it might in fact contribute directly to critical theory 
by putting its data at the service of a causal-functional analysis of capital. Unfortunately it does 
not, for it does not interrogate capital per se. Rather, the book is a description of the historical 
relations between national income and the return on capital. It therefore provides less a causal 
explanation of the return on capital as it does an accounting of the income that accretes to the 
owners of capital. This distracts from the complex, layered, and dynamic nature of capital by 
flattening it into income, and income into wealth. Thus for all its strengths, Piketty’s work 
constrains critical approaches to political economy, and serves further to evacuate the political 
from the sphere of the economic. Critical theorists have much work to do to turn Piketty’s near-
compulsive empiricism into work that can go beyond the narrow disciplinary confines of 
academic economics and reveal and develop understanding of the political core of all economic 
policy. 
 
Piketty’s “Laws” 
Reading Piketty’s Capital carefully requires commitment. The work is a substantial, well-argued 
depiction of systemic wealth and income inequality in modern capitalism. Though the book is 
voluminous, at its heart is a large series of straightforward line graphs depicting long term 
patterns within an impressive array of data: centuries-long time series of national income and 
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wealth statistics across several continents. The simplicity of the graphs is in keeping with the 
spare, even austere, mathematically reduced theses that are presented as laws of capitalism. In a 
world awash in complex, contingent and relativistic theories, Piketty’s rather old-fashioned 
claims to the discovery of unvarying laws is unusual. It further helps to account for the public 
fascination with the book, especially among those who – despite Piketty’s own studiously 
apolitical stance – represent left-progressive policy positions.  
What are the “fundamental laws of capitalism” that Piketty claims to have discovered? 
Expressed in properly scientific Greek letters, the formula of the first such law is α = τ x β: the 
share of national wealth that accrues to capital (α ) is equal to the rate of return on capital (τ ) 
times the ratio of capital to income (β). This law is a “pure accounting identity … tautological…” 
but Piketty argues that it is important since it places the “three most important concepts for 
analyzing the capitalist system” in relation to each other (Piketty 2014: 52). The second law is 
expressed β = s / g: the ratio of capital to income of a country (β) is equal to the savings rate (s) 
divided by the economic growth rate (g) (Piketty 2014: 166). Though not expressed as a 
fundamental law (which serves to distance him from Marx), the formula from the book that 
expresses Piketty’s central argument about inequality in capitalism most directly is r > g: the rate 
of return on capital (r) is greater than the economic growth rate (g). In short, capital accumulates. 
Piketty distills long-range figures for “the inequality r > g” (of 4-5 percent return on capital and 
about 1 percent long term growth) but the variation in time and place is considerable, so that r > 
g “should be analyzed as a historical reality dependent on a variety of mechanisms and not as an 
absolute logical necessity” (Piketty 2014: 361). Though mathematically expressed, Piketty 
avoids complex statistical analysis but rather pictorially represents variations among income, 
wealth, growth, and rates of return in a variety of places and times. There is nothing complex 
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about the math: Piketty’s conclusions result from inferences not inferential statistics. 
To us, the great strength of the book is Piketty’s rigorous aggregation of national statistics 
from very diverse sources that make possible such powerful, large-scale time-series. This was an 
immense undertaking, and Piketty and his collaborators deserve the accolades they have received 
for making this laboriously constructed data set available on his website 
(http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2). Such strenuous aggregation of data into such 
straightforward representations schemas without shilly-shallying is unusual in the contemporary 
academy. Indeed, it is reminiscent of the 19th and early 20th century economic scholarship that 
Piketty frequently cites and openly admires, such as Willford King’s The wealth and income of 
the people of the United States (1915). 
At the same time, however, Piketty scrupulously avoids interpretive claims that might 
pigeonhole him as “left” or “radical” – or even as “French.” His work has impressive scale, but 
its scope is narrow, even pinched, such that no accusation that his academic work might be 
tainted with political motivation be allowed to stick. Even where Piketty admits that political 
factors play a major role in the historical processes he elucidates, he buries his claims deep in the 
text and shies away from interpretive conclusions. For example he states flatly that “the price of 
capital is…always in part a social and political construct….” This significant admission is, 
however hedged rhetorically between two phrases that give it a throwaway character: “Last but 
not least” and “This is obvious…” (Piketty 2014, 188). It thus remains for other scholars to use 
Piketty’s material to found critical interpretive arguments that do not accede to an evacuation of 
the political. 
Piketty is thoughtful, careful and transparent about the sources of this data, and is cautious to 
specify what he feels are appropriate interpretive limitations. Standing back from the book, its 
	
	
	 6
most impressive accomplishment is the revelation of the magnitude and near universality of 
income and wealth inequality. Reviewing the graphs, clear law-like structural relationships 
between Piketty’s concepts come into view: despite massive historical and political changes, the 
ratio of capital to income varies within a surprisingly narrow range across nations and centuries. 
In Piketty’s graphs, patterns of wealth and income inequality appear surprisingly similar across 
national borders that demarcate distinctive political economies. Yet, American critical theorists 
and left-progressives will find it affirming to see that our time (post-1970s) and our place 
(Anglo-American liberal market economies) are indeed especially unequal relative to the recent 
past and to other nations.  
In an interesting and revealing move, in the service of his arguments about the nineteenth 
century and earlier, Piketty even seems to privilege the literary above the political-economic as 
an interpretive scheme. The income and wealth dynamics distilled into formulas and graphically 
depicted by Piketty are frequently illustrated with literature, particularly Honoré de Balzac and 
Jane Austen. The most compelling of these illustrations is drawn from Balzac’s Pere Goriot and 
turns upon a young man’s calculations as he ponders the relative returns to the pursuit of a 
professional career versus marriage to a wealthy woman (see especially Piketty 2014: 238-40). 
Austen’s characters engage in the same ethical calculus, though in a different context and with 
different results. The dilemma faced by these characters captures Piketty’s own moral stance 
toward inherited wealth in capital: given the long-run tendency for r > g, returns to wealth 
frequently exceed returns to work. This turns out to be one of Piketty’s most vigorously 
emphasized themes: as economic growth slows, capitalism reinforces inherited wealth while 
reducing rewards for work.  
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Piketty’s Capital and Marx’s Capital 
Clearly, Piketty’s failure to engage Marx impairs Capital’s utility for critical theorists. Piketty 
does make reference to Marx at several points in his work, which contains within its rhetorical 
framing – though obliquely – a response to and criticism of Marx’s analysis of capital. 
Unfortunately, it also seems that Piketty’s commitment to the maintenance of his credibility 
within transatlantic academic economics leads him to be unduly dismissive of Marx, and to 
appear unwilling to raise serious Marxist questions about the nature and functioning of capital. 
Throughout the book we see a range of rhetorical moves that serve to mask the political moments 
always present within economic activity. 
Piketty has even represented himself as unfamiliar with, if not uninterested in, the basic 
arguments of Marx’s Capital. In an interview with Isaac Chotiner published in The New 
Republic in May 2014, Piketty was asked to “talk a little bit about the effect of Marx on your 
thinking and how you came to start reading him?” Piketty’s responded: “Marx?... I never 
managed really to read it. I mean I don’t know if you’ve tried to read it. Have you tried? … The 
Communist Manifesto of 1848 is a short and strong piece. Das Kapital, I think, is very difficult to 
read and for me it was not very influential.” Chotiner prompted Piketty by noting that “…your 
book, obviously with the title, it seemed like you were tipping your hat to him (Marx) in some 
ways.” To which Piketty responded, “No not at all, not at all! The big difference is that my book 
is a book about the history of capital. In the books of Marx there’s no data.” (Chotiner 2014, 
n.p.). 
Chotiner’s questioning of Piketty about his engagement with Marx is reasonable given 
that the first reference to Karl Marx occurs in the third sentence of the first page of Piketty’s 
Capital: “Do the dynamics of private capital accumulation inevitably lead to the concentration of 
	
	
	 8
wealth in ever fewer hands, as Karl Marx believed in the nineteenth century?” (Piketty 2014: 1). 
On pages seven through eleven, Piketty criticizes Marx’s Capital, boiling it down to several 
theses that he perceives as flawed, including the principles of “infinite accumulation” and 
“perpetual divergence.” Piketty reads Marx’s analysis as symptomatic of economists’ “no doubt 
overly developed taste for apocalyptic predictions” (Piketty 2014: 11). Piketty often pairs Marx’s 
name with the idea of apocalypse: “My conclusions are less apocalyptic than those implied by 
Marx’s principle of infinite accumulation and perpetual divergence” (Piketty 2014: 27).  
Piketty reads Marx as wrongly theorizing an “inexorable tendency for capital to 
accumulate and become concentrated in ever fewer hands, with no natural limit,” signaling an 
“apocalyptic end to capitalism” (Piketty 2014: 9). Marx’s “dark prophecy” was in error because 
of Marx’s ignorance of productivity improvements, because he “totally neglected the possibility 
of durable technological progress and steadily increasing productivity,” which Piketty views as 
“a counterweight to the process of accumulation and concentration of private capital” (Piketty 
2014: 10). This is perhaps the most glaring misunderstanding of Marx in the book: Piketty’s 
repeated claim that Marx “implicitly relies on a strict assumption of zero productivity growth 
over the long run” (Piketty 2014: 27).  
Marx is further criticized for methodological errors, because he “no doubt lacked the 
statistical data needed to refine his predictions” and intellectual dishonesty because he “decided 
on his conclusions in 1848, before embarking on the research needed to justify them” (Piketty 
2014: 10). In a footnote to the text, Piketty adds that Marx “occasionally sought to make use of 
the best available statistics of the day but…in a rather impressionistic way and without always 
establishing a clear connection to his theoretical argument” (Piketty 2014: 580). Piketty 
diminishes Marx as one of a number of proto-economists who “had been talking about 
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inequalities for decades without citing any sources whatsoever or any methods for comparing 
one era with another or deciding between competing hypotheses” (Piketty 2014: 13). Even when 
Marx did use statistics, he “usually adopted a fairly anecdotal and unsystematic approach to the 
available statistics” (Piketty 2014: 229). At moments, Piketty views Marx as a vigorous stylist 
who “evidently wrote in great political fervor” making “hasty pronouncements from which it 
was difficult to escape” (Piketty 2014: 10), and adds that “Marx’s literary talent partially 
accounts for his immense influence” (Piketty 2014: 580). At other moments, Piketty criticizes 
Marx at once for lack of rigor and for unclear writing style: “Marx did not use mathematical 
models, and his prose was not always limpid, so it is difficult to be sure what he had in mind” 
(Piketty 2014: 228). 
We will not narrate full correctives to Piketty’s statements regarding Marx. Even a 
cursory reading of Marx’s Capital, the Grundrisse, or the essay, “Value, Price, Profit” will 
demonstrate Marx’s emphasis upon productivity growth as a consequence of the pursuit of 
relative surplus value. Marx strove to address the statistical evidence that was reliably available 
in his time, and dialectically reconsidered of his positions throughout his life. The degree to 
which Piketty is unschooled in Marx is not a significant issue for us. Rather, the disciplinary 
boundaries of the economics necessarily privileged by Piketty foreclose Marx and Marxian 
analytics. 
The most important consequence of Piketty’s foreclosure of Marx is that capital remains 
fundamentally fetishized as an undifferentiated object that radiates power. Marx’s value theory 
defetishizes commodities, money, and capital, revealing value as generalized labor embedded 
during the labor process and socially validated in exchange. Piketty does not analyze value, 
leading him to conflate capital with wealth, using these terms “interchangeably, as if they were 
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perfectly synonymous” (Piketty 2014: 47). To Piketty, capital is “the sum total of nonhuman 
assets that can be owned and exchanged,” a long list that includes real estate (even private 
homes) and “financial and professional capital (plants, infrastructure, machinery, patents, and so 
on) used by firms and government agencies” (Piketty 2014: 46). To Marx, capital as such refers 
to wealth invested in the process of commodity production where it mixes with living labor to 
produce an excess known as profit. Even King (1915) distinguished between active wealth 
(invested and circulating) and inert or passive wealth. Piketty makes no such distinction, and thus 
ventures no analysis of the constitutive nature of capital (value, the labor process, the working 
day, the extraction of surplus). For him, such work ventures beyond the legitimate discursive 
boundaries of the discipline of economics. 
Marx’s Capital, Volume 1 focuses upon the analysis of production: by defetishizing the 
capital process (seeing commodities as value, as crystalized labor power, by analyzing the 
working day), Marx kept in view the social relationships and political systems that constitute an 
economy. Remaining within the confines of economic disciplinarity, Piketty is unable to 
defetishize capital and to analyze it in terms of the labor process. Inequality is therefore reduced 
to a problem of consumption and distribution, of unequal incomes and possessions. Whereas 
Marx delved deep into work, production, and the labor process to reveal the nature of capital, 
Piketty’s analysis of inequality avoids the workplace altogether.  
 
Convergence and Divergence, Commons and Enclosures 
To Piketty, national inequalities of income and wealth are shaped by contradictory forces 
pushing toward “convergence” (reduced inequality) and “divergence” (increased inequality). The 
failure to defetishize capital by analyzing the labor process is especially limiting when Piketty 
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explains the two forces of “convergence,” both emanating out of colleges and universities: 
diffusion of knowledge and acquisition of skills and training. Piketty views increased acquisition 
of skills and knowledge as the foundation of a “patrimonial middle class” that reduces inequality 
within nations. The same forces – increased education and acquisition of know-how – also lead 
to reduction of inequality between nations. Poor countries of the world take note: “by adopting 
the modes of production of the rich countries and acquiring skills comparable to those found 
elsewhere, the less developed countries have leapt forward in productivity and increased their 
national incomes….” The mechanism is “fundamentally a process of the diffusion and sharing of 
knowledge – the public good par excellence – rather than a market mechanism” (Piketty 2014: 
21). 
Here Piketty gestures toward but fails to articulate with the political-economic arguments 
of the “alter-modernity” theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2011), who see the 
“commons” or “commonwealth” as byproducts created and enriched through capitalism. Forms 
of association, know-how, information, and knowledge generated within capitalism flow into the 
“cultural commons.” Political struggles in our time are less focused upon labor and working 
class activism than struggles against appropriation, privatization, and enclosure of the commons 
in order to foster a de-commodification of social life. Piketty’s uncomplicated assurance that 
knowledge-diffusion and skill-acquisition spread readily to the lower orders underestimates 
capitalist power to enclose. Hardt and Negri (2011) see political struggle as necessary to 
overcome capital’s surveillance and control systems, including the army of property lawyers that 
enforces the trademark, copyright and patent machinery securing intellectual property. 
While Piketty incorporates “immaterial capital” (patents, intellectual property, brands, 
goodwill, trademarks) into his definition of capital, he provides no separate analysis of them. 
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Similarly, his disciplinary constraints do not allow him to recognize the “fictitious” nature of 
immaterial capital (as understood by theorists including Marx, Rudolf Hilferding, and David 
Harvey). Piketty therefore cannot follow Hardt and Negri into a political analysis of the growing 
importance of immaterial production (Hardt and Negri 2011: 132-7), and the important role 
intellectual property law plays in the privatization of culture (Boyle 2003). Analysts who study 
the unpaid labor of consumers point to a condition of double-exploitation that consumers rarely 
understand with clarity and that lies beyond Piketty’s disciplinary horizon (Cova and Dalli 2009: 
29).  
 Disciplinary conventions further seem to limit Piketty’s understanding of the primary 
force behind divergence to the outsized earnings of “super-managers”: “this spectacular increase 
in inequality largely reflects an unprecedented explosion of very elevated incomes from labor, a 
veritable separation of the top managers of large firms from the rest of the population” (Piketty 
2014: 24). Piketty attributes this rise to the selfish interests and exceptional bargaining power of 
top managers in corporations, who “have the power to set their own remuneration, in some cases 
without limit and in many cases without any clear relation to their individual productivity” 
(Piketty 2014: 24).  
Such framing of excessive executive compensation as a classic principal/agent hazard, 
though consistent with academic economic discourse, discounts the politicized financial 
deregulation of recent decades and how it dramatically increased the power of large, speculative 
stockholders to control corporate affairs. Beginning in the 1980s, stockholders of U.S. 
corporations grew more organized and active, electing boards of directors who awarded immense 
stock options to the executives they appointed. Stock options (and bonuses tied to stock price) 
ensured that U.S. executives were focused “liked a laser” upon increasing the short-term value of 
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corporate stock by giving them a “piece of the action” (Krier 2005). Contrary to Piketty’s narrow 
interpretation, executive stock options were not “incomes from labor” that were economically 
justified by “clear relation to their individual productivity” but rather payments akin to bribes 
(Piketty 2014: 24). Piketty makes a category mistake when he views executive compensation and 
stock options as labor income: they are, in fact, a redistribution of the return to capital meant to 
incentivize management to increase returns. The large growth in income inequality that Piketty 
graphs was not due to pay for efficient work, but was a means to forge an unusually powerful 
corporate control structure. 
	
The Varieties of Capital and the Social State 
Writing within the disciplinary conventions of economics, Piketty documents the significant 
divergences in national patterns of inequality revealed in his graphs, but shies away from causal 
analysis. Often, his discussion minimizes national variations while drawing attention to 
overarching similarities, making it appear that he is in pursuit of a unitary theory of wealth and 
income inequality. Fundamental differences between national capitalist systems have given rise 
to the extensive “varieties of capitalism” literature that has developed in the borderlands between 
academic economics, sociology, and business studies (see especially Weber 1946, Hall and 
Soskice 2001, Esping-Anderson 1990, Scruggs and Allan 2008, Krier 2008). Though a variety of 
ideal-type rubrics are deployed in this literature, each finds important differences between 
“liberal market economies” (primarily Anglo-American) and “coordinated market economies” 
(Northern European Social Democracies). Some approaches (Esping-Anderson 1990; see also 
Weber 1930; Weber 1946) identify additional varieties of capitalism clustered in the Catholic 
countries of southern Europe. We have recoded the data files that Piketty has provided to 
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scholars on his website by grouping the nations in his database into three “varieties of 
capitalism”: Northern European social democracies (whose economic ethics align closely with 
Weber’s Pietists), Anglo-American liberal market economies (whose economic ethics align 
closely with Weber’s Calvinists) and Catholic economies (whose economic ethics align closely 
with Weber’s traditionalism). The political dimension is particularly important in accounting for 
differences between these varieties of capitalism in the provision of social insurance and public 
assistance. The intersection of risk-pooled social insurance with political subjectivity (Amidon 
and Sanderson 2012) varies widely across these political economic regimes (See Appendix) 
 Piketty’s disciplinarity also seems to limit his interest in regional and sectional patterns of 
inequality within a given nation-state. Indeed, Capital’s dataset does not parse U.S. statistics into 
counties, states or regions, but remains aggregated at the national level. While Piketty notes in 
passing that U.S. Northern states, during the 19th century at least, had extraordinarily low levels 
of inequality while the southern states had very high levels of inequality that rivaled or exceeded 
aristocratic Europe, and he notes the significance of slaveholding in this dynamic especially in 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries, he ventures no deeper reflection upon how these historical 
politics of expropriation might continue to affect capital formation (Piketty 2014: 158-63). This 
is unfortunate, because county-level U.S. census data on income inequality reveal enormous 
differences among U.S. regions (U.S. Census Bureau 2012): Northern tier states and the Midwest 
exhibit low levels of inequality (on par with contemporary European social democracies) while 
the southern states exhibit exceptionally high levels of inequality (on par with Aristocratic 
Europe at its most unequal peak). Such patterns of regional distinctiveness are consistent with 
Fischer’s (1989) Albion’s seed and with other social histories mapping distinctive subcultures 
laid down by British and European laws and customs. While these European folkways were 
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modified in the American setting, the translation of old world cultures to the colonies often 
resulted in concentration and clarification: the New World setting enabled certain contradictions 
and tonal disharmonies to be worked out, creating cultures with great logical self-consistency, 
durability and self-clarity.  
 
The Evacuation of the Political and its Retrieval  
For the critical theorist who is interested in the possibilities of politics, what can be learned from 
Piketty’s constrained disciplinarity? In his writing and in interviews, Piketty does not simply set 
himself apart from politically engaged scholarship, but projects the entire category of the 
political into the utopian and its dialectically opposed double, apocalyptic prophecy (Piketty 
2014: 6-12). Such distancing is necessary for Piketty to maintain credibility within the branches 
of disciplinary economics committed to positivist, non-Marxist positions. Critical theorists can 
only find it perverse, however, that Piketty, in the name of retaining disciplinary credibility and 
legitimacy within technocratic, bureaucratic policymaking, eliminates practical political 
engagement. In order to preserve the possibility of policy impact, Piketty blunts his book’s 
potential for politics. Piketty not only distances himself from Marx, but discounts his own 
proposal for a global tax on wealth as “utopian,” (Piketty 2014: 471, 515-34). The most 
dispiriting aspect of Piketty’s Capital then is not the dark projections of future inequality, but the 
work’s almost total resignation to disciplinary conformity, such that the scholarly precondition 
for serious consideration by those who determine policy is an abandonment of politics as purely 
utopian. What is even more disheartening is the remarkable modesty, even banality, of Piketty’s 
“utopian” dreams: he calls for a mere 5% tax upon wealth. 
Piketty’s Capital is the product of disciplinary conventions that define anything other 
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than descriptive empiricism as utopian. Within the boundaries of economics, Piketty’s single-
minded focus upon national income statistics need not be disturbed by any serious challenge to 
the nation-state as a meaningful economic unit with globalization processes, nor by any 
Foucauldian interrogation of the motives underlying the state surveillance and control that make 
possible the collection of the data he analyzes, While Piketty’s book may punch his admission 
ticket into the corridors of policy, the messier realities of politics remain for critical theorists to 
analyze.  
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